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22 April 1952

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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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
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4. Trouble in Morocco reported imminent:



Well-placed military sources have told the American Consul in Rabat to expect "serious trouble" in Morocco shortly. Other sources, however, have supplied no recent corroborating information.

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Comment: Despite frequent warnings of a "general uprising" in French Morocco, there is no evidence that the nationalists can stage a full-scale, coordinated revolt. French military authorities probably could maintain control in the event of sporadic disturbances in urban areas.

The young nationalists are reported to be growing impatient with the present policy of restraint established by their more moderate leaders. The Moroccan Communists' capabilities for taking full advantage of the situation are restricted by recent French security measures.

## WESTERN EUROPE

### 5. Slovenes reportedly desert Stalinist party in Trieste:

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American officials in Trieste have received information that the reported schism in the pro-Cominform Communist Party has resulted in the defection of many Slovene members to local Slovene parties, including the pro-Titoist group.

This Slovene minority in the party has apparently been estranged by party chief Vidali's pro-Italian election pronouncements in Italy and by the party's participation in the pro-Italian political strike in late March.

Comment: The recent upsurge of Italian nationalism in Trieste has undoubtedly contributed to the first serious rift in the pro-Cominform party since the Tito-Cominform split. American officials in Trieste received reliable reports in early April that the Communist-led port workers in Trieste were greatly displeased with Vidali's "irredentist" statements.

Although Slovene elements fear a change in the party's line, its new election platform supporting independence for Trieste suggests that their fears are not justified. Other measures designed to heal the breach in party ranks have also been taken by Vidali since his return from Italy.

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6. Anglo-American draft on Trieste believed acceptable to Italian public:

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The American Embassy in Rome believes that the Italian public will accept the substance of the Anglo-American draft on Trieste as a satisfactory conclusion of the London talks, provided the Italian press is not unduly stirred up over the need for a "political agreement," which is not covered by the draft.

The Embassy suggests that the London conference would be more useful to the Italian Government if only a document in general terms were issued for public consumption.

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Comment: [redacted]

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[redacted] Italy is dissatisfied with those portions of the draft which would leave effective control of civil administration, particularly internal security, in the hands of the Allied Zone A Commander.

7. European Defense Community conference agrees to early May deadline:

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[redacted] In view of the urgency for signature of the European Defense Community treaty, the conferees in Paris have agreed on a deadline of 3 May for the completion of their work.

The French delegate suggests that the treaty itself be forwarded to the governments by that date. He believes that any remaining work on the protocols could be finished in time for the final Ministers meeting and the signing scheduled for 17 May.

Comment: The United States had originally proposed 9 May as the deadline for signing the treaty.

Most of the Defense Community members agree that the unresolved issues are minor and could be covered in a protocol after the signing. The German financial contribution is the principal problem blocking complete agreement.


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9. Embassy comments on Franco-Salazar meeting:

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Ambassador MacVeagh in Madrid believes that the conference between General Franco and Portuguese Prime Minister Salazar on 14 and 15 April will not affect American military objectives in the current US-Spanish negotiations. He strongly discounts rumors that Salazar may have proposed that Portugal be included in the present talks.

According to an account of the meeting given the American Embassy in Lisbon by the Portuguese Defense Minister, the only result, aside from an exchange of views, was informal Spanish agreement to permit the transit of Portuguese troops to France in accordance with Portugal's arrangements with SHAPE.

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Comment: While Portugal is not likely to insist on a tripartite pact, [redacted] indicate that it had obtained expressions of Spanish support for such a pact. The Foreign Office seemed certain that Portugal's strong interest in the matter had been conveyed to MacVeagh.

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